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Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race,
Gender, and the Calculation of Economic Loss
Martha Chamallas

Abstract

This article explores race and sex bias in the computation of damages for loss of
future earning capacity, an important component of economic loss in personal injury cases. It analyzes recent cases in the United States and in Canada which reject
the use of race and sex-based tables to determine awards for female and minority
plaintiffs and explains the method used by the special master in the September
11th Compensation Fund. Chamallas explores objections to reform – from both
the “right” and the “left” — and makes the case for connecting civil rights principles to civil litigation.
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CIVIL RIGHTS IN ORDINARY TORT CASES:
RACE, GENDER, AND THE CALCULATION
OF ECONOMIC LOSS
Martha Chamallas*
These days “tort reform” has become a code word for initiatives
that seek to limit liability and reduce the amount or type of damages
plaintiffs receive. It is a one way street that promises few benefits
for injured parties or consumers. Tort reform has not always had this
meaning. Prior to the 1980s, it was more frequently linked to
measures, such as comparative negligence, that sought to soften the
effect of restrictive doctrines and ease recovery for seriously injured
parties. At that time, reform was more reciprocal in structure. For
example, the reform of no-fault compensation for automobile
accidents,1 or the earlier reform of workers= compensation,2 brought
something for everyone—under the quid pro quo enacted by these
no-fault regimes, plaintiffs were no longer required to prove
negligence, while defendants in turn were liable only for economic
losses.
In my view, the most influential tort reformers were the midcentury legal realists, such as Leon Green3 and my former colleague,
Wex S. Malone.4 For this group of legal reformers, legal formalism
was the biggest enemy.5 They sought to reshape legal doctrine to
*

Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State
University.
1. See Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance:
Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 622–34 (2000).
2. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 152–86 (2004)
(discussing the history of workers= compensation statutes).
3. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (1965).
4. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitor and Proof by Inference—A
Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REV. 70 (1941); Wex S. Malone,
The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. NW. U. 151
(1946); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause in Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60
(1956).
5. For an analysis of legal realism and its response to legal formalism, see
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make tort law connect to real world experience. For example, when I
was a student we used Leon Green=s casebook in torts.6 The cases in
that book were not organized according to the familiar abstract
conceptual categories, such as duty, breach, and proximate cause, but
rather according to factual context: there was a section on cases
against doctors and hospitals; a section on highway traffic accidents;
and even a section on accidents involving fixed track vehicles. This
innovative structure showed how serious the authors were about
linking tort doctrine to social experience, even if it made the book
unteachable.
In my view, the reform project of the legal realists is not over.
The unfinished work has to do with linking tort law to our
developing understanding of civil and human rights. Tellingly,
Green=s casebook did not have a chapter on how a person=s race or
gender might affect the outcome of a civil case. Nor did it examine
whether tort recoveries might be affected by the social identity of
those suffering the loss.
As a professor who regularly teaches courses in torts and
employment discrimination, I can attest that, even today, students
rarely see a connection between “ordinary” civil litigation and civil
rights. If we look only at the surface of tort claims, issues of social
justice—particularly equitable treatment of women and minority
social groups—are generally visible only in certain intentional tort
claims. One of the more interesting developments of the last few
decades is how older causes of action—most prominently battery,
assault, false imprisonment, as well as the tort of intentional
infliction of mental distress—have been deployed by sexual and
racial harassment victims7 and victims of sexual and domestic
violence8 to challenge longstanding patterns of oppression and
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467 (1988)
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960 (1986)).
6. LEON GREEN ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1968).
7. See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn, Note, The Garden Path of Boyles v. Kerr and
Twyman v. Twyman: An Outrageous Response to Victims of Sexual
Misconduct, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247 (1995); Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts
as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL=Y & L. 115 (1994);
Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment
at Will: The Case Against the ATortification@ of Labor and Employment Law,
74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 397–420 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional
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exploitation. On this front, however, tort law has functioned mainly
as a modest supplement to other remedies. As Catharine MacKinnon
observed in the late 1970s in her influential book arguing for a
federal cause of action for sexual harassment, tort law tends not to
see the social dimension of an injury and to conceptualize harm
simplistically and dichotomously.9 In the world of torts, there is
either economic loss on the one hand, or individual hurt feelings and
emotional distress on the other.
Beyond these intentional tort cases, it is even harder for
attorneys, judges, and experts to see a civil rights issue in what
appears to be an ordinary tort claim. For many structural reasons—
most prominently the fact that civil rights attorneys tend to be a
separate and distinct group from personal injury litigators10—even
attorneys for plaintiffs are not often primed to detect ways in which
the value of their clients’ injuries is infected by racial and gender
bias or to discern how tort rules reflect a devaluation of particular
social groups. They may not recognize that the tort claims and types
of damages least protected under the law are often the most vital for
marginalized groups in society. In my scholarship, for example, I
have argued that negligent infliction of emotional harm and negligent
interference with relationships are low in the hierarchy of
compensable harms, in part because of their cognitive link to women
and women=s injuries.11 Most recently, in the debate over damage
caps, scholars have documented that non-economic damages are very
important to women,12 particularly homemakers, because such
women are not likely to recover large sums for wage replacement
and other economic loss.13 Although some legitimately worry about
Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268 (1996); Merle H. Weiner, Domestic
Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L. REV. 183 (1995).
9. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 173 (1979).
10. See Richard Abel, Civil Rights and Wrongs, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. ____
(2005).
11. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures
in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998); Martha Chamallas & Linda K.
Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform:
Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1266 (2004).
13. For discussions of the valuation of household labor and its effect on
women, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY 192–99 (2d ed. 2003); REGINA GRAYCAR & JENNY MORGAN, THE
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the commodification of intangible losses,14 in my view, the only
thing worse than having one’s pain reduced to money is having one=s
pain reduced to very little money.
Hidden race and gender bias in tort awards is also present in the
standards used to calculate economic harm, a measurement that
purports to be more precise than non-pecuniary losses. In many tort
cases, particularly those involving severe injuries to persons who
have not yet established a track record of employment, there is much
discretion in determining the all-important category of loss of future
income. Particularly with the growing popularity of caps on noneconomic damages,15 future earning capacity can be a big-ticket item
of damages. It is also of great social importance because it
represents a measure of an individual=s potential.
When I served as a member of the Iowa and Pennsylvania task
forces on gender and race bias in the courts, I was surprised to
discover that it is commonplace for expert witnesses to rely on
gender and race-based tables to determine both the number of years
that a plaintiff would likely have worked (work/life expectancy) and
the likely annual income the plaintiff would have earned.16 Because
the measure of lost earning capacity is largely a function of these two
variables,17 discounted to present value, the choice of tables is
HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW 126–38 (2d ed. 2002).
14. See Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 445, 456 (D. Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
15. As of January 2004, 26 states had caps on non-economic damages.
SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS CAPS
ON
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES, http://greenleaf.pasenategop.com/PDF/
SummaryofStateLaws.pdf (revised Jan. 28, 2004). President Bush has also
been pushing for passage of a federal $250,000 cap on non-economic damages
in medical malpractice actions. See Jessica Heslam, Dad Seeks Prez=s Ear on
Malpractice Caps, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 2, 2005, at 23.
16. EQUALITY IN THE COURTS TASK FORCE, STATE OF IOWA, FINAL
REPORT 118 (1993); PA. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON RACE AND GENDER BIAS
IN THE JUSTICE SYS., FINAL REPORT 236–37 (2003) [hereinafter PA. FINAL
REPORT].
For a more comprehensive discussion of the methods for calculating
lost earning capacity, see Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of RaceSpecific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 73 (1994).
17. See JEROME H. NATES ET AL., 2 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 10.30–.34
(2002); PAUL M. DEUTSCH & FREDERICK A. RAFFA, 9 DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS, 110.10 (2002). As discussed below, predicting the future income of
a young tort victim who has yet to select a career path typically also depends
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crucial.
Race and gender-based tables are in effect race-specific and
gender-specific assessments, comparing, for example, women only to
other women, blacks to blacks, and men to men. Thus, the earning
potential of an individual woman plaintiff is measured by reference
to others in her gender group. This saddles nonconforming women
and racial minorities with generalizations about their group, the very
kind of stereotyping that anti-discrimination laws were meant to
prohibit. For example, if in the past women have taken several years
out of the labor market to raise children, gender-based worklife
tables predict that they will continue to do so in the future.18 If
minority men have historically been incarcerated at a much higher
rate than white men, race-based worklife estimates predict that they
will continue to work fewer years than whites.19 As a practical
matter, the use of race and gender-based tables results in
significantly lower awards for minority men and women of all races.
It also means that historical patterns of discrimination in the labor
market are replicated in tort awards, even though the labor force
participation of women and minorities may be changing rapidly.20
Let me give you an example from a recent case. In U.S. v.
Bedonie,21 an expert testified that the decedent, a young Native
American man who had just graduated from high school would have
earned approximately $433,000 in his lifetime.22 The expert arrived
at this figure by first estimating what the average high school
graduate earns and then multiplying that amount by 58% because
58% was the average ratio of the wages for Native American males
to white males.23 On its own motion, the court asked the expert to
calculate the amount the deceased would have earned without
making any adjustment.24
That figure was approximately
$744,000.25 In the same case, a calculation using a race and sex
on the level of education the victim would likely have attained, but for the
accident. See infra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
18. See Chamallas, supra note 16, at 81–82.
19. See id. at 81, 115.
20. Id. at 88.
21. 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004).
22. Id. at 1313.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1314.
25. Id.
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adjustment for lost earning potential made a huge difference when
the decedent was a Native American woman. Unadjusted, her
earning potential was estimated to be approximately $308,000,
versus only $171,000 when the calculation was based on gender and
race.26
Significantly, although the expert in that case had performed
thousands of lost income analyses, he testified that “no one had ever
asked him to provide race and sex-neutral calculations in a wrongful
death case.”27 It seems that the lawyers had relied on the economists,
and the economists never questioned the appropriateness of using
race and sex to predict earning power. This is a dramatic
demonstration of how race and sex bias can sometimes be eclipsed
by statistics.
In some contexts, the use of race and gender-based economic
data can result in a systematic undervaluation of recurring types of
injuries. For example, legal commentators have analyzed the impact
of using race-based calculations in lead paint litigation.28 Lead
poisoning is often caused by ingesting paint chips or dust, likely to
be found in older, deteriorating buildings in low-income
neighborhoods.29 Depressed awards for plaintiffs derive from the
fact that the population of lead paint victims is disproportionately
young children, typically poor, African-American or Hispanic
children.30 This means that, in making assessments of the lost future
earning capacity of these children, there is often a lack of
individualized evidence that indicates what career path the plaintiff
would have taken and what he or she would likely have earned over
a lifetime. In such cases, resort to statistics may well be the best
available method of prediction. When lost earnings are calculated
using race-based tables, however, whether to measure average
earnings or worklife expectancy, the awards are considerably lower
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1315.
28. See, e.g., Laura Greenberg, Note, Compensating the Lead Poisoned
Child: Proposals for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 429 (2001); Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ,
Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure
Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025 (1997).
29. Greenberg, supra note 28, at 432–33.
30. Id. at 430, 432–33 (children under five years of age are most susceptible
to lead poisoning).
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than they would be for comparably injured white victims.
Defendants in such cases, typically landlords or government housing
authorities, thus pay far less than they would if their victims were
predominantly white, middle-class children. Additionally, because it
is cheaper to injure poor minority children, there is less incentive for
defendants to take measures to clean up toxic hazards in the
neighborhoods most affected by lead paint.
The reliance on race and sex-based economic data, and the
comparable practice of making race and sex adjustments to arrive at
an estimate of lost earning potential, is the equivalent of using
explicit race and sex classifications.
This is not subtle
discrimination, but overt discrimination of the kind that the
constitution and anti-discrimination laws have long outlawed, or at
least have made hard to justify.
It is well established in
constitutional law that race-based classifications trigger strict
scrutiny31 and that sex-based classifications trigger a stringent
intermediate scrutiny.32 Under Title VII, moreover, virtually all
race-based classifications are prohibited,33 while sex-based
classifications are allowed only in the rarest of cases in which sex is
a bona fide occupational qualification for a particular job.34 Notably,
in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,35
the U.S. Supreme Court held that sex-based actuarial tables could not
be used to justify requiring female employees to pay higher monthly
contributions to an employer-run retirement fund, despite the fact
that women as a group live longer than men.36 This strong distaste
31. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (landmark
case using strict scrutiny to determine validity of racial classification). Even
when the classification reflects “reality” in the sense of acknowledging that
race often matters in shaping human behavior, the Supreme Court has insisted
on applying strict scrutiny. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33
(1984) (race of stepparent could not be considered in child custody decision
because the law could not give effect to private prejudice).
32. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (to withstand
intermediate scrutiny, justification for sex-based classification must be
Aexceedingly persuasive@).
33. See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473–74 (11th Cir.
1999). The exception is for narrowly tailored affirmative action programs. See
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206–08 (1979).
34. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (BFOQ
exception based on gender reaches only special situations).
35. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
36. Id.
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for explicit race and sex classifications, however, has not yet carried
over into ordinary tort cases. Instead, when experts rely on race or
gender-based statistics to calculate tort damages, we tend not to
notice the discrimination and to accept it as natural and
unproblematic.
I recently read an interesting historical study by Jennifer
Wriggins of wrongful death cases in Louisiana decided in the first
half of the twentieth century.37 In several appellate cases, the court
reduced an award for a black victim after comparing it to the amount
that other black victims had previously recovered. Today, we would
likely regard such explicit segregation in evaluating awards as
clearly inappropriate, as an artifact of a pre-civil rights era.
However, reliance on gender and race-based tables amounts to an
updated version of this same discriminatory practice.38 The
prohibited segregative move behind each method is its reliance on
the depressed status of the racial or gender group as the benchmark
for an award to an individual plaintiff.
The illegitimacy of practice is perhaps most evident when we
consider the difficulty courts and juries face when the injured party is
biracial or multiracial. One such prominent case is Wheeler TarpehDoe v. United States,39 involving the categorization of a biracial male
child, Nyenpan Tarpeh-Doe, whose father was Liberian and whose
white mother lived in the United States. In that case, the court was
confronted with the uncomfortable question of whether it should
select the Awhite@ tables or the Ablack@ tables to determine lost
earning capacity. The opinion was notable for its time because the
court simply refused to decide whether Nyenpan was black or white
for purposes of choosing the appropriate statistic. Instead, the court
decided to use blended tables combining persons of all races.40
37. See Jennifer Wriggins, The Color of Injury: Race, Gender and Torts in
the First Half of the Century (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
38. See generally Reva B. Siegel, AThe Rule of Love@: Wife Beating as
Pre rogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L. J. 2117 (1996); CHAMALLAS, supra
note 13, at 10–11 (discussing reproduction of patterns of male dominance in
updated forms).
39. 771 F. Supp. 427 (D.D.C. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 28 F.3d 120
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
40. Id. at 455. The court also decided to use gender-neutral tables. Id. For
a discussion of this aspect of the case, see infra note 134134135 and
accompanying text.
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In an earlier article, I argued that the use of race or gender-based
estimates is an unconstitutional practice that amounts to telling the
jury that it is permissible to treat men and women, or whites and
minorities differently.41 Imagine, for example, a state legislature that
adopted a statute compelling or authorizing a jury to make a racial
adjustment when calculating an award for a member of a minority
group whose average member earns less than a white person. If such
legislation would be regarded as unconstitutional, the same
constitutional infirmity applies to an expert=s use of explicitly racebased economic data in a civil case. I submit that there is no less
state action when the court permits an expert to base his calculations
on race-based tables or to make race-based adjustments in arriving at
an estimate.42 However, even if a court were reluctant to declare that
the Constitution forbids the use of race or gender-based economic
assessments in tort cases, it still retains the discretion to refuse to
admit such assessments on public policy grounds. Some courts may
prefer this approach because it avoids the constitutional question, but
nevertheless allows the common law to grow incrementally in a
manner consistent with constitutional norms.43
When I first starting writing about this issue, I received
correspondence from attorneys indicating that they had been
successful in making jury arguments in individual cases that the
damage award should not be lower simply because the victim was a
young woman or a member of a racial minority. In one case, a
lawyer represented two young children—a brother and a sister—who
had been severely injured in a car accident. The plaintiffs’ attorney
successfully argued that the girl=s award should not be lower than her
brother=s.44 But there had not yet been a clear trend in the courts that
taking race or sex into account was either unconstitutional or against
41. See Chamallas, supra note 16.
42. Id. at 105–11.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1319 (D.
Utah 2001) (avoiding reaching constitutional question and exercising its
discretion to use blended tables to further public policy of Afavor[ing] victims
of violent crime and against the possible perpetuation of impermissible
stereotypes@).
44. For a reported case in which a Canadian court awarded the same
amount of economic damages to a brother and sister injured by their mother=s
abuse, see Cho v. Cho, [2003] 36 R.F.L. (5th) 79 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), 2003
CarswellOnt 708 (Can.).
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public policy.
Recently, however, arguments against race and sex-based
calculations have been making headway. In the United States, the
movement has largely occurred outside the torts arena, specifically
within the context of the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund45 and an important criminal case involving mandatory victim
restitution.46 In Canada, however, broader tort reform has already
begun to take hold. In several significant cases, Canadian courts
have rejected female-specific actuarial tables, opting for more
egalitarian approaches.47 The pressing question in that country
seems to have shifted from whether gender fairness ought to be a
consideration in calculating economic loss, to how best to implement
gender equality.
Let me start with the developments in the United States. The
authorizing legislation for the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund gave Kenneth Feinberg, the Fund’s Special Master,
considerable discretion to determine the amounts that families of the
victims would receive when they elected to give up their right to sue
in tort and instead to take compensation under the no-fault Fund.48
Initially, Feinberg indicated that in calculating economic loss, he
would rely on gender-based tables as is frequently done in tort
litigation.49 It should be noted that although the prototypical 9/11
victim is a man, 739 women were killed in the September 11th
attacks.50 During the comment period before adoption of the final
rule governing distribution under the fund, however, the NOW Legal
Defense Fund objected to the use of gender-based worklife
45. See Martha Chamallas, The September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51
(2003).
46. See Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285; see also Childers v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., No. 96-194V, 1999 WL 218893, at *15–*18 (Fed. Cl. 1999)
(special master rejects gender-based worklife estimate in favor of neutral
figure for all workers in claim under the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program).
47. See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities
in Personal Injury Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49
MCGILL L.J. 309 (2004) (collecting cases).
48. Chamallas, supra note 45, at 69.
49. Martha F. Davis, Valuing Women: A Case Study, 23 WOMEN=S RTS. L.
REP. 219, 220 (2002).
50. Chamallas, supra note 45, at 69.
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expectancy tables and urged Feinberg to reconsider his
methodology.51
Feinberg ultimately agreed with NOW Legal Defense that the
awards should not disadvantage the families of women and set about
fashioning a remedy. In my scholarship, I have argued that genderneutral or blended tables should be used for both men and women.52
This would generally have the effect of raising awards for women,
but lowering awards for men.53 Rather than use this method,
however, Feinberg decided to use male tables for both men and
women, thus raising the awards to families of female victims without
lowering the awards to the families of male victims.54 This solution
was in keeping with the Act=s policy of being generous to the 9/11
families, but did not seriously deplete the Fund, because there were
comparatively fewer female victims.
The next important development occurred in May 2004, when
Judge Cassel of the federal district court in Utah was faced with the
task of determining how much compensation family members of two
murder victims should recover under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act.55 In U.S. v. Bedonie, as described earlier,56 the
murder victims were both Native American, one male, one female.
The court decided that as a matter of public policy, no downward
adjustments for either race or sex should be made to the awards.57
Unlike the 9/11 Special Master, however, Judge Cassel decided to
use blended, gender and race-neutral tables to determine
compensation, rather than to peg the awards to the average, white
male earnings.58
What I find most significant about these two developments is
that when the issue was squarely raised, the connection between civil
damages and civil rights was recognized by the both the Special
Master and Judge Cassel. I realize that the September 11th Fund
may be unusual because the 9/11 victims are often regarded as

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 71.
See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 16, at 122–23.
Id.
Chamallas, supra note 45, at 71.
U.S. v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004).
See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.
Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
Id.
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heroes, not simply ordinary tort victims,59 and the money to finance
the Fund came from the general treasury.60 In the restitution cases,
we again had very sympathetic plaintiffs—the families of a murder
victim—and perhaps less concern for imposing disproportionate
liability on the defendants given their status as a convicted felons.61
In my view, however, once the assumptions behind genderbased or race-based tables and race or sex adjustments are made
visible, they will no longer be regarded as acceptable for use in civil
litigation generally. The Canadian experience on this point is
instructive. Starting first in the courts in British Columbia,62 and
then spreading to Ontario,63 courts have responded positively to
arguments by plaintiffs= attorneys that expert calculations of
economic loss should be scrutinized to ensure that they are not based
on assumptions or tables that are unfair to individual women or that
serve to perpetuate patterns of gender inequality.
The most prominent case in Canada to date is probably Walker
v. Ritchie,64 decided by the Ontario Superior Court in 2003. In many
respects, Walker is a good example of an ordinary tort case, if the
common tragedy of grievous personal injury can ever be classified as
ordinary. Stephanie Walker was seventeen years old when she was
injured in a serious car accident.65 She suffered a head injury and
brain damage, which manifested itself in residual paralysis and
irreversible cognitive deficits.66 The court determined that as a result
of the accident Stephanie would be permanently disabled and unable

59. Chamallas, supra note 45 at 76.
60. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No
107-42, 406(b), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001).
61. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (“If an economic tortfeasor may not
profit from his own wrong, the same principle applies, a fortiori, to . . . a
violent criminal. Indeed, violent criminals have far less right to complain
about uncertainties left in the wake of their terrible crimes.”).
62. See, e.g., Shaw (Guardian ad litem of) v. Arnold [1998] B.C.J. No.
2834 (B.C.S.C.) (QL), 1998 CarswellBC 2731 (Can.); Tucker (Guardian ad
litem of) v. Asleson [1993] 102 D.L.R. (4th) 518, 528, 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 173
(B.C.C.A.), 1993 CarswellBC 94 (Can.).
63. See, e.g., Walker v. Ritchie [2003] O.J. No. 18 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL),
2003 CarswellOnt 10 (Can.); Cho v. Cho [2003] 36 R.F.L. (5th) 79 (Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.), 2003 CarswellOnt 708 (Can.).
64. [2003] O.J. No. 18 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL)(Can.).
65. Id. at ¶ 3.
66. Id. at ¶ 43.
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to obtain competitive employment during her lifetime.67
At the time of the injury, Stephanie was in her last year of high
school and did not yet have any definite plans to attend college.68
The court learned that she was an above-average student and an
outstanding athlete69 and that her two older sisters had attended
university and become teachers.70 However, as is often the case
when victims are injured when they are children or teenagers, no one
could predict with certainty what path Stephanie=s life would have
taken if she had not been injured.
The court first determined that given the severity of her injuries,
Stephanie was entitled to receive $250,000 for non-economic
damages, the maximum allowable under Canada=s capped recovery
system.71 Before calculating a figure for lost future earning capacity,
however, the court had to choose between an expert-derived figure
based on average earnings for female university graduates
($1,070,694) and another expert=s figure based on average earnings
for all university graduates ($1,690,250).72 In opting to base
recovery on the higher blended figure,73 the court cited prior
decisions which had criticized the use of gender-based tables because
of their potential to perpetuate the effects of gender-based wage
disparity and for their failure to take account of trends toward a
narrowing of the wage gap in Canada and increased labor force
participation by women.74 The court also preferred the blended
approach because it saved it the additional step of having to decide
whether any upward adjustment should be made to the plaintiff=s
award.75 Some courts in Canada have, along these lines, attempted
to infuse gender fairness into the damage award for a female plaintiff
67. Id. at ¶ 123.
68. Id. at ¶ 44, 128.
69. Id. at ¶ 44.
70. Id. at ¶ 76–80.
71. Id. at ¶ 99.
72. Id.
73. The court did, however, make a downward adjustment of 10% to
account for the contingency that Stephanie might not have chosen to attend a
university and another deduction of $100,000, the amount the court estimated
Stephanie would earn by engaging in minimum wage (non-competitive) labor
suitable for persons with her disability. Id. at ¶¶ 141–42. The award for future
wage loss was thus reduced to $1,421,225. Id. at ¶ 143.
74. Id. at ¶ 133, 134.
75. Id. at ¶ 135.
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by “grossing up” an award based on female-specific actuarial tables
to reflect the possibility that plaintiff might not have followed one of
the typical career paths for a woman, choosing a male-oriented
career instead, complete with higher earnings.76
What is striking to me about Walker is the practical importance
of this one detail of damages computation. In Stephanie’s case, the
decision to use a gender-neutral approach was worth approximately
$600,000, more than double the amount she received for noneconomic damages. The case highlights just how much discretion
lies in the hands of courts, juries, and experts in computing damages
and shows that the treatment of gender can be as significant as the
individual facts of the case.
Canadian courts have also employed other approaches to infuse
gender equity into damage awards for female tort victims. Similar to
the approach of the 9/11 Special Master,77 some trial courts in
Canada have used male tables to calculate awards for female
plaintiffs,78 presumably because such tables are regarded as free of
gender bias and better reflect what the earnings will be for both men
and women in the future.79 Some commentators in Canada also
prefer the use of male tables over blended tables80 and have
expressed concern that courts might be tempted to use blended tables
only for female plaintiffs.81 It should be noted, however, that the
standards used for damage computation in Canadian courts are quite
varied and are not always internally consistent. In one case, for
example, a court used male tables to compute earnings loss for a
female plaintiff and then made a 10% Afemale-specific@ discount to
take account of the contingency that women will continue to earn

76. See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 316 n.13.
77. See text accompanying supra note 54.
78. See, e.g., MacCabe v. Westlock Roman Catholic Separate School Dist.
No. 110 (1998), [1999] 226 A.R. 1 (Alta. Q.B.), 1998 CarswellAlta 897 (Can.),
rev’d in part (2001), [2002] 293 A.R. 41, at ¶ 101–09, 2001 CarswellAlta 1364
(Alta. C.A.) (Can.); Tucker (Guardian ad litem of) v. Asleson (unreported)
Vancouver Reg. No. B871616 (April 25, 1991, B.C.S.C.)(Can.), discussed in
Jamie Cassels, (In)equality and the Law of Tort: Gender, Race and the
Assessment of Damages, 17 ADVOCATES= Q. 158, 182–84 (1995).
79. See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 321.
80. See, e.g., id.; Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Damages for Loss of Working
Capacity for Women, 43 SASK. L. REV. 7 (1978–79).
81. See Anjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 318.
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less than men.82
Although the issue has been percolating for over two decades,
gender fairness in the computation of damages is now highly visible
in Canadian tort law and is likely to gain greater visibility in the
United States as soon as the developments in related areas of
compensation law migrate into tort law. Not surprisingly, the issue
of gender and race equity has also recently caught the attention of
forensic economists who are engaged in such projects as developing
gender-neutral worklife tables and revising their methods for
conducting economic loss appraisals.83 The pace of change in this
area is likely to accelerate as experts become accustomed to
challenging gender and race-specific estimates and stand ready to
offer alternatives to the court.
Like so many important issues of law and public policy,
proposals to change the method of calculating economic loss in tort
law are subject to objections from both the “right” and the “left.”
The objections on the right have been most visible and center on
concerns for accuracy.84 They are typically grounded in the claim
that gender and race-based calculations do no more than mirror
reality and place tort victims in the position they would have
occupied absent the discrimination.
The concerns on the left have mainly appeared in the Canadian
commentary. They sound a more progressive tone and stress the
incompleteness of this type of incremental tort reform. The worry
here is that change will reach only a fraction of injured people and
will do little substantively to redistribute income more generally in
society.85 For reasons I summarize below, I believe that these
objections can be, and indeed, have already been adequately
countered. The developments in Canada suggest that as more light is
shed on the issue, the debate in the United States is also likely to
shift from whether any change is necessary to what specific
alternatives should be adopted.
82. See Gray v. Macklin (2000), 4 C.C.L.T. (3d) 13, at ¶ 197 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.) (Can.).
83. See Kurt V. Kruger, Worklife at Home and in the Labor Force, Paper
presented at the Conference of the National Association of Forensic
Economics, Eastern Economic Association, Session on Gender and Race
Issues in Forensic Economics (March 4, 2005).
84. See infra notes 86–120.
85. See infra notes 121–133133134 and accompanying text.
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In assessing the objections that have been made to reform, I start
with a specific proposal in mind, namely, that in cases in which a tort
victim has no sufficient track record of employment from which an
individual assessment of earnings potential can be drawn, an estimate
of future earning capacity should be made only from gender and
race-neutral statistics (i.e., blended tables) and that no specific
gender or racial downward adjustments should be made to reflect the
depressed earnings potential of the group. As so framed, the
proposal is informed by constitutional considerations, in that it
singles out explicit racial and gender classifications—classifications
that have been established as constitutionally suspect or disfavored—
and does not address other potentially troubling factors, such as the
impact of social class and family background on earnings potential.
Despite its limits, however, the proposal is far from modest: if
adopted, it will make a dramatic difference in recoveries in certain
cases, precisely because it does address two important social
identities that have historically shaped the workplace and the larger
society. Moreover, as mentioned earlier,86 courts have the discretion
to adopt the reform proposal as a matter of public policy in tort
litigation, without reaching the constitutional question.
The most familiar objections to abandoning gender and racespecific data are generally couched in terms of “accuracy” and at
first blush may seem to fit well with the compensation principle of
restitutio in integrum, the principle that seeks to restore the accident
victim to the condition he or she would have occupied absent the
accident. This criticism is most often aligned with the more general
tort theory of corrective justice, which sees tort law as aimed at
righting individual wrongs and as focused on the personal
responsibility of the defendant to rectify conduct causing harm.87 In
its starkest form, the objection based on accuracy starts from the
premise that the only legitimate goal of tort law is to restore the
victim to the status quo ante. The next step is to assert that gender
and race disparities are located in the larger society (e.g., prevailing
wage rates) and that accident victims should not seek compensation
from defendants to make up for societal inequities. Thus, the
86. See supra note 43.
87. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 56, 56 (David G. Owen ed.,
1995).
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argument goes, if the statistics show that women and minorities work
fewer years than white men and/or make lower averages wages, tort
damages based on those statistics are a fair and accurate
measurement of what they likely lost as a result of the accident.
However, both the starting premise of this argument and the
conclusions that purportedly follow from it have been sharply
questioned and do not hold up under scrutiny. It is perhaps easiest to
see the flaws in the conclusions. Even some critics of reform
acknowledge that current practices are deficient insofar as the race
and gender-based statistics upon which estimates are based do not
mirror current or future realities. As one critic of reform aptly noted:
Astatistical evidence is cogent only if it is recent.@88 Briefly stated,
there are two important respects in which statistics about average
worklife and average earnings can produce an unreliable guide to
future earning capacity: (1) if they are outdated and reflect patterns
of the past, rather than the present, and (2) if they are not refined to
take account of future trends affecting the gender or racial group,
even if they accurately describe the status quo at the time of trial.
Thus, one nagging problem has been that the worklife tables
used by courts and experts to project the length of time a plaintiff is
expected to participate in the workforce are often outdated. In public
testimony before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court=s Committee on
Gender and Racial Bias, a forensic economist explained that official
worklife estimates were first published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) in 1982 and were most recently updated and
expanded in 1986.89 He went on to explain that because labor force
participation for women has increased dramatically since 1986, it is
commonly recognized that the BLS tables are obsolete.90 As a result,
economic researchers have created worklife tables based on more
recent unpublished data from the Current Population Studies (CPS),
such as the updated tables created by Ciecka, Donley and Goldman
in 1998.91 In making economic loss estimates, therefore, experts
may be forced to choose between the official, outdated estimates and
88. See Mitchell McInnes, The Gendered Earnings Proposal in Tort Law,
77 CANADIAN B. REV. 153, 154.
89. See PA. FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 237 (reporting testimony of
Robert A. Wallace).
90. Id. at 238.
91. Id.
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more current estimates that are not as widely accepted in practice. In
this economist’s view, experts are sometimes hesitant to use the
more current data because they fear that the courts will reject any
estimate of economic loss that is not based on official sources.92 On
this point, it is interesting to note that because of concerns for
timeliness of the data, the 9/11 Special Master decided to rely on the
unofficial, updated tables prepared by Ciecka, Donley and Goldman,
rather than to use the official government data.93 As noted earlier,
however, he elected to use the male tables to calculate loss of future
income capacity for both male and female victims.94
Of course, insofar as worklife estimates are outdated, they will
not provide a reliable guide to worklife expectancy for either men or
women. However, because there has been such an appreciable rise in
women’s labor force participation in the past few decades—because
more women are working and are taking less time out of the paid
workforce to raise children95—the use of outdated statistics ends up
disproportionately disadvantaging female tort victims and their
continued use clearly cannot be justified by any concern for
accuracy.
A somewhat more difficult problem derives from the fact there
is no unfailingly accurate way to predict the future. Even if worklife
tables and tables of average wages were to be compiled from the
most recent data on the day before trial, without further refinement,
they would still not generate precisely accurate figures from which to
derive future estimates, unless we were to assume that there would
be no changes in the labor force participation rate of women or in the
size of the wage gap between the relevant social groups. Particularly
when losses are projected decades into the future, as is the case when
the plaintiff is injured as a child or young adult, any estimation of
92. Id.
93. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg.
11238 (March 13, 2002).
94. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
95. For example, from 1985–1996, the labor force participation for women
grew from 54.5% to 58.8%, with the biggest increase coming from women
who were also mothers. Howard V. Hayghe, Developments in Women’s Labor
Force Participation, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Bureau of Labor Statistics), Sept.
1997, at 42, 45–46. Although the rate of increase is not as high as it was in the
1970s, the trend was described as “continuing, long-term labor force
participation rate gains for women, particularly those with children.” Id. at 46.
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future trends is bound to be contestable and contested, provided only
that the parties understand the methods of computation. Thus,
forensic economists know that the models used in loss appraisals
must include variables to account for social change, notably changes
in the pattern of women=s working lives and the likely narrowing of
the wage gap. Several courts in both the United States and Canada
have also recognized that if historical data are not refined to take
account of such future trends, the effect will be to saddle historically
disadvantaged groups with the burdens of the past and to compensate
them at below the market rate, simply because they were unlucky
enough to become tort victims.96
Once we acknowledge that the tables must be refined and cannot
be used “off the shelf,” we have passed imperceptibly from a
discussion about historical facts to a debate about the influence of
social forces, the direction and rate of social change, and matters of
judgment and interpretation upon which there is no societal or
professional consensus. Thus, although most people seem to think
that the gender wage gap will narrow in the future, there is no
agreement about when and whether parity will occur. Likewise, no
confident judgments can be made about how much time women will
take away from the paid workforce to raise children twenty years
from now. This is not to say that economists are not capable of
making reasoned and informed estimates on these matters.97 Rather,
it is merely to highlight that when economic models are uncritically
accepted as accurate predictions of the future, it tends to mask the
fact the law is handing off this difficult judgment to an outside
professional group, a group with no special expertise in matters of
gender and race inequality.
More fundamentally, the objections about accuracy fail to
appreciate that predictions about the future have a way of
simultaneously affecting the present and constructing the future.
Take a small example relating to the narrowing of the gender wage
96. See, e.g., Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 997 (D. R.I. 1987);
Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 167 (1st Cir. 1988); Childers v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., No. 96-194V, 1999 WL 218893, at *17 (1999);
Audet (Guardian ad litem of) v. Bates, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1068 at ¶ 76
(B.C.S.C.) (QL), 1998 CarswellBC 644 (Can.).
97. In fact, when economists rely on blended tables, they must still refine
the tables to account for future trends and certainly cannot be blind to trends
among women in arriving at an estimate for the population as a whole.
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gap. Some Canadian courts have noted that the size of the gender
gap in wages in part depends on the sector in which the plaintiff
would have been employed, noting that pay equity initiatives have
been more prevalent in public employment and in organized
workplaces.98 However, the degree to which the pay equity
movement will take hold in firms in the private sector is not wholly
removed from the debate over computation of damages in tort cases.
As one commentator remarked “in compensating both males and
females at the same rate, tort law would make a dramatic statement
regarding the type of equality to which it aspires.”99 And it is not
fanciful to believe that the example set by tort law would generate
additional pressure for pay equity in the workplace, similar to the
effect that equal pay and other sex equality initiatives have had in
stimulating proposals for gender fairness in tort law since they first
appeared in the mid-1970s. It is at this point that the line between
accuracy and aspiration becomes blurred. It is possible to shape the
future in a certain way, in part by predicting that it will take that
shape. When courts award damages for loss of earning capacity in
tort litigation, they do more than passively pass on the market price
of plaintiff=s labor; they express a view about the future and should
not be oblivious to their own role in constructing that future.
The willingness of economists and courts to rely on sex and race
as a measure of an individual=s future earning potential may have as
much to do with habit as it does with strict fidelity to the restitutio
principle. With respect to future earnings capacity, the judgment to
select race and gender over other possible predictors may be affected
by a cognitive bias that overstates the importance of the highly
salient personal characteristics of race and sex.100 Thus, I suspect
that if the data clearly indicated, for example, that Catholics earned
higher incomes on the average than Baptists, courts would be
reluctant to predict future earning capacity based on religious
denomination.101 In such cases, there would likely be a sense that
98. See, e.g., Walker v. Ritchie [2003] O.J. No. 18 at ¶¶ 134–35 (Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.) (QL), 2003 CarswellOnt 10 (Can.).
99. McInnes, supra note 88, at 155.
100. For a fuller development of this argument, see Martha Chamallas, The
Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463,
484–89 (1998).
101. See id. at 486 n.81 (describing regression analysis indicating that for
years 1991, 1992, and 1994, Catholics were almost one and one-half times
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using religion as a variable was somehow inappropriate, even if it
seemed to have predictive value. The objection to using religion
would be based on a judgment that any past disparity in income
between Catholics and Baptists was not a function of a lasting
difference between the two groups, but more likely explainable in
terms of opportunities that were historically disproportionately
available to higher earning Catholics. The argument would be that
using religion to predict future income is not only inappropriate, but
inaccurate, because as opportunity structures change, religion will
cease to be a valid predictor of the future. Thus, because Baptists as
a group presumably do not possess personal traits that would prevent
them from gaining income parity in the future, it is unjust to saddle
individual tort victims who happen to be Baptist with the legacy of a
discriminatory past.
In contrast, I believe that what lies behind the willingness to use
race and sex to predict future economic loss is the unspoken
assumption that, regardless of equal opportunity initiatives, race and
gender will continue to be powerful predictors of income because, in
the final analysis, women and racial minorities lack what it takes to
compete with white men in the workplace.102 In this context, the
selective use of race and gender as a supposedly accurate measure of
the future has the effect of naturalizing racial and gender differences
and eclipsing the role that lack of opportunities and the persistence of
racial and sex bias play in producing pay disparities in the
workplace. Relying on race and sex-based statistics reinforces the
view that race and sex differences are inevitable and enduring, rather
than a product of political and social arrangements that are subject to
change. What looks on the surface to be a hard-boiled argument
about accuracy turns out to implicate the politically-charged debate
about the sources of disparities in our society and the role of law and
the courts in reproducing patterns of inequality.
Along a similar vein, the current debate about privatizing Social
Security shows how race-based statistics can sometimes be
uncritically accepted as objective fact, without noticing that
projections of the future inevitably involve speculation and political
judgments that cannot flatly be declared to be either accurate or
more likely than Baptists to have a household income above $25,000).
102. Id. at 487.
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inaccurate. In a recent editorial, Paul Krugman criticized President
Bush=s claim that Social Security was a bad deal for African
Americans. The Bush position is that statistics show that African
American males die sooner than other males and thus do not live
long enough to collect their fair share of benefits.103 Krugman
argued that such use of race-based life expectancy statistics was
misleading for a variety of reasons,104 one of which was that it took
“as a given that 40 or 50 years from now, large numbers of AfricanAmericans will still be dying before their time.”105 Krugman likened
such an assumption to a “bigotry of low expectations”106 and one
likely to shift focus away from the variable quality of available
health care in the United States and a black infant mortality rate that
is two and one-half times higher than that of white infants.107
Thus, even if the only concern of tort law was to accurately
measure losses, the foregoing arguments indicate that continued
reliance on gender and race-based tables would not achieve that
objective. However, it is also important to recognize that the starting
assumption that undergirds the argument in favor of gender and racebased tables—the assumption that the only legitimate concern of tort
law is accuracy—is also highly debatable.108 Even a traditionalist
scholar, such as noted treatise writer Dan Dobbs, introduces students
to tort law by explaining that tort law is not limited to corrective
justice ideals, such as the restitutio principle in damages, but has also
been shaped by ideals of distributive justice and by public policy
concerns that look at the impact of tort rules on how goods are

103. See Paul Krugman, Little Black Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at
A21.
104. Krugman stressed that President Bush=s remarks perpetuated a “crude
misunderstanding about what life expectancy means.” Id. He explained that
low life expectancy for black males is largely due to high death rates in
childhood and young adulthood and that African-American men who live to 65
can expect to collect benefits at a rate not that far below the rate for white men.
Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of
Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998) (disputing
contention that tax and welfare laws are a more efficient means of
redistribution than private law).
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distributed within the larger society.109
Because both corrective and distributive justice ideals, including
a concern for group equality, can be found in tort law, the public
dimension of tort law should not be overlooked.110 To give just one
prominent example, consider the public policy exception to the atwill employment rule that gained strength in the 1970s and served to
redistribute a measure of wealth from employers to discharged
employees.111 This doctrinal reform was prompted by concerns that
looked beyond the individual parties to the dispute, as courts took the
position that employers should not always be free to use their power
to terminate workers in ways that undermined larger societal goals.
Notably, one of the earliest cases to endorse the public policy
exception was a sexual harassment case in which the court held that
it violated the state’s public policy to allow a private employer to
terminate a female employee for refusing to have sex with her
foreman.112 In that case, the court balanced the public interest in
fostering sex equality against the employer=s interest in running its
business, i.e., the court deemed it proper to consider distributive ends
in shaping the private law.
Because distributional considerations have affected the shape of
tort law, the key question in my view is not whether it is ever proper
to deviate from tort law principles to interject distributional
considerations, but whether social justice concerns ought to influence
the shape of the particular tort rule in question. As Canadian scholar
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey has pointed out, to insist that distributional
concerns have no place in tort law presupposes that the status quo is
fair and equitable and deserves to be replicated. In criticizing such a
narrow corrective justice position, she argues that “corrective justice
is only aimed at formal equality. It does not question the justice of
the status quo or the relative positions of the parties.”113
When seemingly neutral tort rules replicate an unequal status
quo, it becomes that much more difficult for disadvantaged social

109. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 9, 13–16 (2001) (“Tort law often
takes policy and utility into account as well as rights or corrective justice.”).
110. See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 341–47.
111. For a general discussion of the public policy exception, see MARK A.
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 9.9, at 438–43 (3d ed. 2004).
112. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 550–51 (N.H. 1974).
113. Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47, at 344.
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groups to bring about social change. In a recent Canadian law
journal, for example, Tsachi Keren-Paz discussed the Asystematic
regressive effects@ of the Learned Hand formula.114 Building on the
scholarship of Richard Abel,115 Keren-Paz starts from the insight that
under the Hand definition of negligence, “it is cheaper to harm poor
victims than rich ones,”116 and thus “the existing tort system provides
incentive to tortfeasors to harm the disadvantaged.”117 He gives an
example in which AJ.R.@ is deciding where to build a refinery.118 J.R.
knows that there is a safety device costing $800,000 that would
decrease the probability of an explosion by half, from 0.2 to 0.1. An
explosion would cause $10M in damages in Richtown, but only $7M
in Poortown, because of differences in property values and future
lost earnings. Thus, the savings in expected loss from installing the
device in Poortown is only $700,000 (.1 x $7M), less than the cost of
the device. However, the savings in expected loss in Richtown is
$1M (.1 x $10M), more than the cost of the device. The Hand
formula instructs that J.R. is negligent if he builds the plant without
the safety device in Richtown, but that he is not negligent if he builds
it in Poortown. The upshot is that if the plant is ultimately built in
Poortown and an explosion occurs, the residents will have to absorb
the $7M loss without the benefit of tort compensation, making
Poortown that much poorer.
My argument is that the current method of relying on race-based
and gender-based tables to calculate lost earnings potential has
similar regressive effects. This is most evident when large scale
harm disproportionately affects members of a minority group, as in
the example of lead paint victims discussed earlier.119 The regressive
effect is present, however, whenever the measurement of damages is
based exclusively on a market that is itself not free from gender and
race bias. The important point to recognize here is that because the

114. See Tsachi Keren-Paz, An Inquiry into the Merits of Redistribution
Through Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness, 16 CAN. J. L. &
JURIS. 91, 94–95 (2003).
115. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA. L. REV. 785, 822–
31 (1990).
116. Keren-Paz, supra note 114, at 94.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 95–97 (containing example).
119. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
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status quo is neither natural, nor always fair,120 injecting gender and
race equity into tort rules serves a neutralizing function, as a modest
corrective offsetting built-in regressive effects. Thus, critics of the
use of gender and race-based tables tend to frame their arguments in
the alternative—first, emphasizing that the traditional approach does
not lead to accuracy and, alternatively, arguing that accuracy is not
everything.
Once we get beyond the concern for accuracy, the scholarly
debate over the proper measurement of damages for lost earning
capacity becomes more of a discussion about the advisable scope of
reform, rather than a defense of gender and race-based tables. The
concerns on the “left” address a variety of specific issues but tend to
focus on the incomplete or incremental nature of some of the
proposals to change the method of calculating future income loss and
generally express a desire for more radical reform of tort law. Cast
in its broadest terms, the issue is whether compensation in tort should
be fundamentally redirected, away from its current reliance on the
market in computing compensable losses more toward a system that
would determine compensation in accord with individual need.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the difference in political climate in
Canada and the United States, Canadian scholars have been more
willing to advocate needs-based reform.121 My scholarship, in
contrast, is less utopian and reflects the limited prospects for
widespread progressive tort reform in the United States.
With respect to the use of blended tables for plaintiffs with no
track record of earnings,122 there are three Aincompleteness@ concerns
that are interrelated and most likely to surface in any future debate.
The first and second relates to the class of plaintiffs who would
directly benefit from the reform. The third relates to the alternative
method of computing losses the law should endorse.
120. For a more theoretical discussion of this point, see MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW
70–78 (1990) (disputing the unstated assumption that the status quo is “natural,
uncoerced and good”).
121. See, e.g., Cassels, supra note 78; Jamie Cassels, Damages for Lost
Earning Capacity: Women and Children Last!, 71 CAN. B. REV. 445 (1992);
Elaine Gibson, The Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages in
TORT THEORY 185, 209–11 (Ken Cooper Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds.,
1993).
122. See supra notes 52–53, 73–76.
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The first concern arises from the fact that the proposal covers
only those injured parties with no established earnings record and
would have an impact principally in cases involving young tort
victims.123 This means that the large majority of female and minority
plaintiffs would not see their awards increased because their awards
would continue to be calculated using their current earnings as a
baseline. Thus, an adult female tort victim who worked in a lowpaying predominately female occupation would not benefit from the
proposal, except insofar as her worklife expectancy were increased
by the use of gender-neutral tables. Because the proposal applies
mainly to young tort victims, it does not address the situation of large
numbers of adult women who suffer pay inequities as a result of
gender segregation in the labor market.124 As the debate over
comparable worth has shown,125 any reform that does not challenge
job segregation is bound to be limited. A more radical proposal, for
example, would allow adult women plaintiffs to receive an award
based on average earnings (using blended or male tables) to make up
for the devaluation of predominately female jobs.
Despite its limited effect, restricting reform to plaintiffs without
an established earnings record makes sense to me, at least in the
short run, precisely because it does not require a radical redirection
of the basis for calculating damages in tort. The proposal authorizes
use of general statistics only in those instances where resort to more
individually-based assessments is not feasible. It thus does little to
disturb the resitutio principle of tort compensation and still fits
within an overall corrective justice orientation to tort law. Because
at this moment in history, the individualistic focus of tort law in the
United States is so solidly entrenched, it is highly unlikely that any
123. There are also some unusual cases in which the victim suffers injury as
a young child but does not sue until many years later, such as a child
molestation case against an abusive parent. See, e.g., D v. F., [1995] B.C. J.
No. 1478 (Can.), discussed in McInnes, supra note 88, at 165–66. The court in
such cases would have to decide whether the abuse lowered the plaintiff’s past
and future ability to earn even if the plaintiff had already “chosen” a career
path.
124. Nor does it address any gender pay discrimination suffered in the past
by the individual plaintiff beyond that which is traceable to working in a
predominantly female job.
125. For a discussion of some of the major sources addressing the issue of
comparable worth, see KATHARINE T. BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 303–20 (3d ed. 2002).
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reform that departed substantially from it would gain much support.
Compared to a proposal that would allow an adult plaintiff to
measure economic loss by reference to average earnings, moreover,
my proposal avoids grappling with the related and equally difficult
question of whether individual tort victims—male or female—whose
economic loss is above the average should be fully compensated in
tort.126 Proposed reforms that extend to plaintiffs with established
earnings records would more directly challenge the historical
practice of basing tort recoveries on the market-based earnings
history of the individual plaintiff, and for that very reason, may die
on the vine. Finally, I would note that, for those young female and
minority plaintiffs covered by the proposal, it is not a meager reform:
because the proposal computes loss of future earnings capacity on
blended tables of average wages overall, not on the lower wage rates
of predominantly female or minority jobs, it ameliorates disparities
arising from devaluation of those jobs to some degree.
The second concern stems from that fact that the proposal
prohibits resort to gender-based and race-based data only and does
not attempt to deal directly with disparities that arise from social
class or family background. Admittedly, this limitation is most
important in the subset of cases in which the proposal operates,
namely, when the plaintiff is young and has no established track
record of earnings. In those cases, an expert estimating a plaintiff=s
lost future earning capacity will typically first determine the level of
education the plaintiff would likely have attained, e.g., a high school,
community college, or university education. After making that
determination, the next step is to look at a table of average wages for
that category, often further divided by gender and/or race. As
framed, the proposal does not take issue with an expert’s initial
determination and reliance on educational attainment in determining
average wages and instead targets only the factors of gender and
race.
The case law demonstrates that predicting what level of
educational attainment plaintiff would have achieved absent the
injury is both an important determination and one that is not always
126. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 45, at 67–69 (describing the
controversy surrounding the decision by the September 11th Special Master to
presumptively cap economic damages at a yearly salary of $231,000,
representing the 98th percentile of individual income in the United States).
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easy to make.127 Although courts will generally consider plaintiff=s
expressed career desires and any educational accomplishments prior
to the accident the plaintiff can document (e.g., grades in school,
scores on standardized tests), there is often not that much in the
record to go on. Thus, it is not unusual for courts also to consider the
educational level of plaintiff’s parents and the level and type of
education that the siblings of the plaintiffs have received,128 two
variables that are closely tied to social class. Children from poor or
working-class backgrounds are therefore likely to recover
significantly lower awards than children from middle and upper class
homes. To this degree, the method of calculating lost future income
has a tendency to reproduce social class, in much the same way that
reliance on gender and race-based tables perpetuates race and gender
disparities in society. A more comprehensive egalitarian approach
would simply be to set the award for loss of future income at average
earnings in all cases involving child plaintiffs.
Such an average earnings approach has its appeal, particularly
because it would obviate the need for speculative predictions that
might prove hurtful to plaintiffs and their families, where, for
example, an expert concludes that the plaintiff would probably not
have gone on to college. Nevertheless, in my opinion, a proposal
limited to race and gender that allows estimates to be based in part
on predicted level of education and other class-inflected factors
remains the single best reform at this time.
There are three reasons why I would limit reform to gender and
race. First, as mentioned above, there is a decided preference for
individualized determinations in U.S. tort law. Despite its possible
class bias, the determination of the level of educational attainment
the plaintiff would have achieved (and the career the plaintiff might
have pursued) is essentially an individualized determination that
involves considerations of a variety of factors, rather than a simple
classification of the plaintiff into a social category. Unlike
classifying the plaintiff as male or female, or white or black, this
127. See, e.g., Gilborges v. Wallace, 379 A.2d 269, 276–77 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1977) (selecting among three possible amounts depending on
differing levels of educational attainment).
128. See, e.g., Ross (Guardian ad litem of) v. Watts, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1998
(B.C.S.C.) (QL), at para. 118, 121, 144, 1997 CarswellBC 1901 (Can.);
Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 –94 (D.D.C. 1996).
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factual determination can be “opened up” to take into account more
factors, simultaneously making the determination more
individualized and less class-biased. Thus, relying on what is known
as the psychological theory of “resiliency,”129 commentators have
urged experts and courts not to overlook those “protective factors” in
a person’s life that lead to success and allow many to rise to the top
despite adversity.130 For example, although poverty is a significant
risk factor that reduces the chance for economic success later in life,
in some cases, a strong “multigenerational network of kin and
friends” can help an individual overcome the risk and be upwardly
mobile.131 Particularly because the determination of lost future
incapacity is aimed at measuring human potential, it seems desirable
to encourage individualized evidence that tends to deconstruct
potential and to show how it is not always dependent on social class.
Thus, there is less need in this instance to rely on average statistics to
reduce class bias and achieve more egalitarian results.
Second, under our constitutional system, classifications based on
sex and race have been treated differently, and with a much greater
degree of suspicion, than class-based distinctions. It is well
established, for example, that legislation that is disproportionately
harmful to low-income persons is not entitled to heightened scrutiny
and will not be struck down by courts unless it is utterly irrational.132
This feature of constitutional law is also reflected in the larger social
discourse that tends to regard race and gender distinctions as more
controversial than distinctions based on social class, at least insofar
as ability to pay is the measure of social class. Thus, I believe it
would be far easier for courts and legislatures to support the notion
that, as a matter of public policy, a plaintiff’s race or sex should play
no role in determining a damage award, than it would be to convince
them that it is wrong to consider predicted educational levels in
setting damage awards because this tends to disadvantage poor and
working-class children.
129. See Greenberg, supra note 28, at 453–58.
130. Id. at 455–56.
131. Id. at 456 (quoting EMMY E. WERNER & RUTH S. SMITH, VULNERABLE
BUT INVINCIBLE: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RESILIENT CHILDREN AND
YOUTH 155 (1982)).
132. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17–29
(1973) (declaring that poverty is not a suspect classification and that
discrimination against the poor receives only rational basis review).
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Finally, I would point out that eliminating race and sex-based
calculations will to some degree capture and reduce class-based
disparities. There is no dispute that racial minority groups are
disproportionately poor, and addressing race-based disparities will
help to ameliorate poverty for plaintiffs who fall within these groups.
Moreover, because there is a correlation between poverty and being
female—as the phrase “the feminization of poverty” so well
describes133—eliminating explicit gender bias has a progressive class
effect for women as a group. One needy group that will not benefit
from the proposal as it is framed is non-minority, low-income men
because their disadvantage stems exclusively from social class.
The third and most troubling concern relates to which method
for computing loss of future income capacity should be adopted,
once it is decided that the use of gender and race-based tables are
inappropriate. To date, there has been a split in opinion. My
proposal aligns with those courts—most prominently the
Wheeler134and Bedonie135 decisions in the United States and the
Walker136 ruling in Canada—that have chosen to rely on blended
tables for both men and women. However, there is also strong
support for using the higher male tables for all plaintiffs, as the 9/11
Special Master137 elected to do and as reflected in some court
rulings138 and thoughtful commentary in Canada.139 It does not take
long to realize that the choice of tables is significant: under the
blended tables, men, including some minority men,140 would receive
lower awards than under the old system and women of all races
would receive higher awards using male tables than if blended tables
were selected.
133. See, e.g., Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives On Equality And
Gender Discrimination in Employment, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 501, 510–
11 (2004).
134. Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C.
1991), rev’d on other grounds, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
135. United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 1285, 1319 (D. Utah 2004).
136. Walker v. Ritchie [2003] O.J. No. 18 at ¶ 135–36 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.)(QL), 2003 CarswellOnt 10 (Can.).
137. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 78 (collecting cases).
139. See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 47.
140. See Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe, 771 F. Supp. at 456 (noting that minority
male plaintiff recovered less using blended tables than he would have using
race-based male tables).
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At the outset, it is important to counter an initial objection that
might be made to use of male tables, namely, that because the male
tables amount to gender-specific classifications, they are subject to
the same objections as the use of female-specific tables. Such an
argument is simply untenable in this remedial context. Behind the
constitutional prohibition and public policy objection to gender
classifications lies the principle that men and women should not be
subject to disparate standards under the law, that there should be a
uniform rule governing both sexes. Thus, as counterintuitive as it
may initially seem, there is no constitutional infirmity with using
male tables for all plaintiffs, precisely because both sexes are being
treated identically.
In my view, the core of the debate behind the choice of remedies
can be found in two important inquiries: whether use of blended
tables would result in undercompensation of women (and men) and
whether courts could reliably resort to male tables, without also
reinforcing longstanding stereotypes of women as marginal workers
whose primary career is motherhood and domestic labor. I regard
both as close questions, but ultimately come down in favor of using
blended tables to determine loss of future income in the United
States.
The argument against use of blended tables starts with the
proposition that women’s wages have been depressed because of a
variety of gender-biased practices and policies: the devaluation of
women’s work, the inequitable treatment of part-time workers and
the social perception that as the primary caretakers of children,
women are less committed to their jobs. Given these features of the
labor market, opponents of blended tables reason that because such
tables combine depressed average female wages and average male
wages, they still are tainted by discrimination and thus are an
inappropriate measure of earning potential.141 They prefer to use the
higher, nondiscriminatory male figures for everyone. Under this
view, the remedy should be to “level up” women to the higher male
standard142 and thereby ensure that no one’s award is lowered as a
141. Id. at 321–22.
142. For a discussion of the choice to level up or level down as a remedy for
equal protection violations, see Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves
Everybody Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2004).
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result of the reform.143
I have no quarrel with the first important observation about the
gender-biased features of the labor market that have a depressing
effect on women=s wages. In my view, there is ample evidence of
widespread discrimination in and devaluation of the work that
women perform.144 However, I am less convinced by the corollary
arguments that the male wage rate is fair and nondiscriminatory or
that the male standard is the preferable standard to use in this
context. Instead, we have reason to believe that the male rate may be
inflated because some men are earning above the market or fair rate.
Thus, in their case studies of pay equity cases, Robert L. Nelson and
William P. Bridges found that there were gender pay disparities in
both the private and public sector, in part because of a built-in inertia
in pay scales within organizations that resulted in paying women
wages at or below the market, while paying some groups of men well
above the market rate.145 In other words, in the world of wages, it is
probably the case that there is both female disadvantage and male
privilege. The key question becomes whether some of that male
privilege is unjustified. Particularly in an era where there is great
political pressure to reduce tort awards, it seems important not to
press for a reform that will produce an increase in awards overall, if
the major inequity is in the distribution of awards. When it comes to
economic loss, women and minorities may deserve a larger slice of
the pie, but I am not sure that the pie should be enlarged.
Perhaps equally as important, I am concerned about the message
that endorsement of the use of male tables might send to courts,
experts, and other actors in the legal process. As mentioned earlier,
use of male tables in this context is not truly a gender-specific
practice because the male tables are used as a proxy for a fair,

143. Using the male standard would also track the approach of the Equal Pay
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (2000), which makes it unlawful to reduce the pay
of any employee in order to comply with the Act. The employer’s only option
is to raise the pay of women to the male rate.
144. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 13, at 187–92 (discussing devaluation of
predominately female jobs and part-time work).
145. See Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579,
586–87, 593, 595 (2001) (reviewing ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P.
BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS, AND
UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (1999)).
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nondiscriminatory measure of earnings.146 However, I suspect that
many courts will nonetheless balk at using the male tables in cases in
which they conclude that the injured female plaintiff would likely
have followed a Afemale@ career path, for example, where a young
girl expressed the wish to become a pre-school teacher and her sister
had already chosen such a path. Even if this is not the intent of
reformers, use of male tables might well reinforce a genderconsciousness in this area, particularly because the issue involves
such “gendered” topics as occupational choice, duration of working
life, and potential income. It has been my experience that when there
is talk about “gender difference” in the workplace, it is often code for
“women’s inferiority,” making it hard to notice gender without also
reinforcing women=s subordinate status. Among the most resilient
stereotypes relating to women workers are maternal stereotypes,147
namely, that women are better suited to homemaking and domestic
life, than to work and public life. For me, a decided advantage of
using blended, rather than male, tables is that it does not highlight the
gender of the prototypical worker and thus does not subtly encourage
decision makers to question whether the particular plaintiff is “male”
enough to qualify for the higher rate of compensation. Finally, there
is the hope that endorsement of blended tables will encourage
economists and government data collectors to generate new and
more refined gender and race-neutral tables and will expose the need
for infusing gender equity into the methods adopted and used by
non-legal professionals.
In the final analysis, I find the use of blended, gender and raceneutral tables an appealing solution because such an approach does
not produce a false neutrality, but instead relies on a composite
measure that incorporates the experiences of both men and women
and persons of diverse races. I realize that advocacy of gender
neutrality or color blindness can have perverse effects, if it serves
only to produce formal equality and actually deepens the substantive
disparities between social groups. In computing future income
capacity, however, use of blended tables will substantively raise
146. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
147. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief
for Family Caregivers who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV.
WOMEN=S L.J. 77, 90–98 (2003) (discussing the content of stereotypes
affecting mothers and other caregivers in the workplace).
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awards for women plaintiffs and will lessen disparities traceable to
race. I favor such a solution because it is a formal, easily understood
reform that will make a substantive difference.
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